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This project is divided between a case study about Aston Martin Lagonda (AML) and the 
correspondent Teaching Note. AML is a centenary luxury auto brand known for the exceptional 
design and power of its cars and the recurrent financial difficulties. After going public on the 
London Stock Exchange, AML faced poor operational performance and financial distress, leading 
to a rescue finance at the beginning of 2020. The Case Study raises questions about the reasons to 
take the company public, the IPO valuation, the factors that led AML close to bankruptcy, the 
impact of financial distress, and the rescue deal.  
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Aston Martin Lagonda: shaken and stirred? 
On Monday afternoon of March 30, 2020, Aston Martin Lagonda (AML) organized a general 
meeting and approved a £536 million rescue deal composed of a placement of shares to a 
consortium led by Lawrence Stroll followed by an excessively dilutive rights issue. Stroll would 
become the Executive Chairman and the top shareholder in the company after the rights 
subscription period of 17 days. He needed to design an effective plan to enhance the business 
turnaround after AML had lost 85% in stock price since the IPO on October 3, 2018. 
Aston Martin had a vast 107-year history producing British high-performance luxury driving 
masterpieces. James Bond's favorite car brand had been owned and managed mostly by auto 
enthusiasts that preserved the cars Power, Beauty, and Soul and sustained a business that never 
reached consistent profitability. Aston Martin went bankrupt seven times in its history, and Stroll 
avoided the eighth. Could he provide a profitable long-term future for AML? 
 
The players and trends in the Automotive industry 
In the last two decades, a series of mergers and acquisitions in the auto industry established 
large global automakers that concentrated car brands in several market segments. At the end of 
2019, FCA and PSA announced a merger to form the world's fourth-largest carmakeri. Exhibit 1 
shows the leading car manufacturers by revenue and their brand portfolio.  
In 2019, the number of motor vehicles sold worldwide decreased for the first time in 10 years 
at about 4.49% to 91.4 million unitsii. This decrease was mainly due to the trade war between the 
two biggest auto markets, the US and China, and a change in consumer preferences. Industry trends 
pointed towards electrification and demand for technology-driven features such as autonomous 
driving and network connectivity, which required significant R&D investmentsiii. Stricter emissions 
regulations added to the costs bill the higher emission taxes and fines. Consequently, 80,000 jobs 
were cut in 2019 as the car industry restructured to accommodate new trendsiv. The uncertainty 
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provoked by Brexit also hassled the Auto Market in Europe. The UK left the EU in January 2020 
after four years of political indecision. The arrangements would persist until the end of 2020, but 
the Brexit deal was yet to be sealed, and its implications remained indefinitev.  
The COVID-19 pandemic started in China at the end of 2019 and quickly spread to the rest of 
the world, forcing governments to implement curfews. The shutdown of factories and trade 
restrictions triggered a shortage of auto parts and finished vehicles, matched by lower demand as 
dealerships closed doorsvi. Automakers could hardly cut fixed costs and had insufficient liquidity 
to support a business deprived of revenues (Exhibit 2 shows the impact on sales in 2020). As the 
future remained uncertain, the deep crisis might force auto companies with low liquidity to bankrupt 
or be acquired by private equity players or better-capitalized manufacturersvii.  
 
The luxury car segment 
The global luxury market was estimated to be worth around €1.3 trillion in 2019, of which 
€550 billion correspond to the luxury cars segmentviii. This market had been growing steadily in the 
last decade, although at a diminishing rate in 2019. The luxury cars segment was one of the fastest-
growing segments at 7% last year (constant exchange rates)ix. Luxury SUV sales more than doubled 
in 2019, driving the growth of the luxury auto industryx. 
The leading players in the luxury car market might be part of an extensive manufacturer 
portfolio of brands, as in the case of Bentley, Lamborghini, and Rolls-Royce (see Exhibit 1) or an 
independent brand as Aston Martin, McLaren, or Ferrari. These manufacturers commit to low 
production volumes and exceptional quality to sustain exclusivity and status among customers. Its 
most vital asset is its brand legacy and reputation for uniqueness, elegance, and power, founded on 
significant product development investments and high selling pricesxi. 
Historical growth in the luxury market is linked to the number of HNWI (those with more than 
$1 million in investable wealth)xii, the key customer. Despite having decreased slightly in 2018, in 
2019, the number of HNWI grew 8.8%, and their financial wealth increased 8.6% after a strong 
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stock market performance. North America achieved the highest growth in both indicators, although 
China had been the growth driver in the recent pastxiii (see Exhibit 3). The first quarter of 2020 had 
seen a sharp decrease in financial wealth, as markets lost around $18 trillion in February and March 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although there were concerns about a possible global recession, 
a slight recovery was expected following a strong government stimulusxiv.  
 
The history of Aston Martin Lagonda 
In 1913, the engineer Robert Bamford and racing driver Lionel Martin, two long-date friends 
and business partners, decided to produce racing cars in a small factory in Londonxv. Bamford & 
Martin Limited started with the Coal Scuttle model in 1914. With this car, Martin conquered the 
famous Aston Hill race, near Aston Clinton, England, where he used to pilot special-edition models. 
The car brand was then named Aston Martin, after the hill and the driverxvi.  
Production would be delayed later that year, when World War I started, and Bamford and 
Martin joined the British Army. After the war, Bamford left the company in 1920, and Martin took 
charge and set up the company's international racing debut in the French Grand Prix of 1922xvii. 
Even though Aston Martin became associated with power and style, it went bankrupt several times 
until 1926 when Martin sold the company, then renamed Aston Martin Motors. During World War 
II, production of a troubled Aston Martin shifted to aircraft components. After this period, Aston 
Martin's golden age, known as the DB Era, would be born under David Brown's command. He 
owned a large engineering firm and dreamed about creating sports cars. In 1947, he bought both 
Aston Martin and Lagonda for less than £100,000, benefiting from their vulnerable position after 
the warxviii. Lagonda was another British luxury car brand founded in 1906, recognized for its 
saloons. The company would later be renamed Aston Martin Lagonda (AML). 
AML started producing the DB series (named for Brown initials), beginning in 1948 with DB1, 
the DB2 in 1950, and several other sequential launches. Brown enhanced cars' power, comfort, and 
engineering. He substituted steel for aluminum in several parts, which improved drivability and 
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designxix. The cars' exclusivity would be perpetuated by the 007 film franchise, starting in 1964's 
Goldfinger with DB5 model. Aston Martin's license to kill became its most powerful marketing 
tactic, building exclusive cars' heritagexx, shown in Exhibit 4. Aston Martin racing cars continued 
to conquer numerous World Championships, being the victory at 24 hours Le Mans in 1959, one 
of the most iconic, with Carroll Shelby at the wheel of DBR1xxi. Despite the great prestige, David 
Brown was forced to sell AML in 1972 since it barely reached break-even during his ownership.  
The next 20 years would depict successive changes in ownership and management. The 
managerial turbulence deteriorated production efficiency since no major car platforms1 were 
launched. In 1988, Ford Motor Company took a minority interest in Aston Martin and launched in 
the following year the Virage car platform. In 1993, Ford consolidated a majority stake on AML 
and built the Gaydon factory in Warwickshire, England. AML launched multiple car platforms and 
reached economies of scale in V8 and V12 engines' production in the Ford factory in Cologne, 
Germany. In 1995, Aston Martin reached a record of 700 vehicles produced in a year, and the launch 
of the DB7 platform would later produce higher volumes than all previous DB series models 
combined. Ford aimed to exploit synergies on shared knowledge, equipment, and components 
production within a portfolio of acquired premium and luxury brands. Jaguar and Volvo were 
acquired in 1989 and 1999, respectively, and Land Rover was combined with Jaguar in 2000.  
The financial crisis in 2008 severely impacted US auto manufacturers General Motors, 
Chrysler, and Ford. The first two went bankrupt, and Ford was subjected to a series of divestitures 
as part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program that distributed government funds by the three 
automakersxxii. Ford sold Jaguar Land Rover to Tata Motors for $2.3 billionxxiii and Aston Martin 
to a Kuwait-based consortium of investors in a deal worth £479 million ($925M)xxiv. This 
consortium was later denominated Adeem/PW Shareholder Group and was coordinated by David 
Richards, a British racing enthusiast, and CEO at Prodrive. 
 
1 A car platform is a production shared system aiming to reduce costs by sharing design, engineering and logistics between models. 
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David Richards became Aston Martin Chairman, while Dr. Ulrich Bez stayed as CEO for his 
work of launching new car platforms and improving production processes under Ford ownership. 
Together, they focused on racing and concept models targeting collectors of luxury cars with 
exceptional design and longevity. Despite the unique cars created, AML started incurring losses 
again after 2010. AML was struggling to reach pre-crisis sales volumes due to lower production 
efficiency and lower demand. In 2012, only 3,574 units were sold, about half of the volumes in 
2007. Aston Martin lacked funds to enhance production and invest in R&D compared to 
competitors owned by large and well-capitalized manufacturers, such as Fiat's Ferrari, 
Volkswagen's Bentley or BMW's Rolls Royce. In this context, the Italian private equity group 
Investindustrial invested £150 million ($241M) for 37.5% of AML at the end of 2012xxv.  In 2013, 
Ulrich Bez announced his retirement as CEO when the company celebrated 100 years of existence. 
Before leaving, he secured a partnership with Daimler to develop V8 engines and other components 
in exchange for a 5% stake in AMLxxvi. In September 2014, Andy Palmer was announced as CEO 
and took responsibility for a challenging turnaround as he planned the firm's second century. 
 
Andy Palmer and the Second Century Plan 
Andy Palmer was an industry veteran with 35 years of experience completed before arriving 
at Aston Martin, having spent 23 years at Nissan. Endowed with exceptional engineering and 
business skills fomented in British universities, in 1991, Andy joined Nissan coming from Rover 
Group. The aftermath was a successful career in which Palmer climbed an extensive hierarchy to 
become Chief Planning Officer, Co-Chief Operating Officer, and head of Nissan's luxury brand 
Infiniti. Living in Japan for 13 years, he became "one of Renault-Nissan Chief Executive Carlos 
Ghosn's inner circle of managers."xxvii In an interview with Financial Times, Palmer said, "I wanted 
to be the CEO of a car company (…) I don't think I would ever have succeeded Carlos Ghosn."xxviii 
In 2014, he finally reached his dream job in one of the most prestigious brands in his home country.  
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AML's private equity owners designed a five-year investment plan of £500 million in 2013, 
aiming to double sales by 2018. The proceeds were targeted to the design of new models and the 
relaunch of successful car platforms. However, the majority of capital was instead covering 
operating costs. In 2014, Aston Martin nearly tripled pre-tax losses compared to the prior fiscal 
yearxxix and carried an excessive amount of debt (see Exhibit 5). The last big success, DB9, had 
been launched 10 years before, and sales growth relative to peers had decreased sharplyxxx. 
A cultural shift was a priority for Palmer. He wanted to implement the same kind of rigor as a 
large manufacturer and eliminate job redundancies. AML cut 295 positions, 14% of the firm's staff. 
Palmer said, "there's a financial need to be scaled relevant to our turnover."xxxi This was followed 
by an organizational restructuring to flatten the hierarchy, minimize bureaucracies, eliminate 
cultural siloes, and restore the unique Aston Martin values. Concurrently, he built an experienced 
team capable of driving long-term value for the company (see Exhibit 6). 
The Second Century Plan sought to revive the Aston Martin brand and boost sales, achieving 
financial sustainability (see Exhibit 7). First, the firm designed a whole renewed car line-up, having 
secured additional funding for R&D. Borrowing costs deteriorated to around 10%, and debt had 
become an unsustainable source of funds. Generating enough operating cash flows to secure yearly 
R&D costs was essential. AML's peers presented different strategies. Under FCA ownership, 
Ferrari had limited production to 7,000 sports cars yearly. After its spin-off through an IPO in 
October 2015, it raised annual production volumes to 10,000 units in five years to drive operating 
resultsxxxii. However, raising production is risky even if there is significant excess demand since 
luxury products' value is linked to their rarity and exclusivity. McLaren, a privately-owned rival, 
expanded down to the premium segment to enhance operating resultsxxxiii, but AML ruled out this 
option since lower price options could damage the brand reputation. AML decided to remain purely 
in the luxury segment but diversifying beyond sports cars, reinforcing specials, and entering new 
segments. It planned to introduce an SUV, the DBX, and the first electric high luxury vehicles. 
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In 2016, Palmer's Second Century Plan reached the second phase with the launch of DB11, the 
first full production sports car under Palmer's executivexxxiv. The DB11 car platform allowed for 
shared services and components, generating cost savings for subsequent launches of the new 
Vantage, DBS Superleggera, and even DBX (see core model characteristics and expected launches 
in Exhibit 8). The second phase also counted with a new Specials Strategy. Aston Martin planned 
to launch two high performance and one heritage special-edition models each year. With an average 
selling price (ASP) substantially above core models, they generate higher margins and contribute 
to the development of cutting-edge technology and design to be incorporated in future core 
modelsxxxv. Specials require a deposit upon customer order and are usually cash flow positive 
throughout the product life cycle, relieving the firm's operating working capital. The firm also 
expected to fund the majority of specials' Capex with customer deposits. High-performance specials 
were developed under partnerships with Red Bull Racing and Williams Engineering, and although 
they were very costly to develop, they preserved Aston Martin Racing's legacyxxxvi.  
AML maintains partnerships with Ford in V12 engine development and Daimler in V8 engines 
and other interior features. This Asset-light approach to production processes and R&D reduced 
fixed costs and made the company flexible to disruptions in the automotive marketxxxvii. AML can 
focus on its esteemed aluminum body design and handcrafted assembly. Indeed, the Gaydon factory 
uses only one robot for bonding aluminum, called ironically, James Bonderxxxviii. Palmer was proud 
to present hand-made luxury cars but emphasized the need to robotize further the factories, 
particularly with emerging 3D printing technologyxxxix. An Aston Martin took up to 220 hours being 
assembled compared to 20 hours for a premium vehiclexl. 
AML also created Q by Aston Martin, enabling a customer to work with the Aston Martin team 
to build a personalized car choosing from the engine (V8 or V12) to every design aspect. These 
options kept customers attached to the brand and willing to remain on waiting lists for the Second 
Century Plan's models. Clients can visit the Gaydon factory to see their unique Aston Martin being 
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prepared. The need to reinforce incumbent segments and enter new ones made AML invest £200 
million in a new factory in St Athan, Wales, expected to be finished in 2019xli.  
The rising sales volumes and margins in 2017 and promising prospects enabled AML to 
refinance debt at better terms with Sterling and Dollar Senior Secured Notes of £230 million at 
5.75% interest rate and $400 million at 6.5%. In 2017, AML sold 5,098 units, up from 3,687 in 
2016, disclosing the first net profit since 2010. Revenues grew almost 50% to £876 million with a 
record final quarter delivering £309 million in sales. The US and China markets were the growth 
drivers. Palmer claimed, "The turnaround is done, (…) now it's all about growth"xlii. 
 
The Initial Public Offering 
In August 2018, AML revealed intentions to take the company public in the London Stock 
Exchange after announcing its seventh straight quarter with profits. Palmer said, "We have seen 
almost unprecedented investor interest."xliii Investors were awakened for a valuation close to 
Ferrari's multiples, the only listed luxury automaker. Ferrari's stock price had appreciated more than 
150% since its IPO in October 2015. Investors opted to value Ferrari as a luxury company, and its 
stock had been trading consistently at larger multiples relative to large automakers. Exhibit 9 
presents information regarding comparable companies in the luxury and automotive industries and 
details about Ferrari's IPO and financial performance. AML would start a one-month roadshow 
with an extensive team of investment banks and advisors that would try to convince investors that 
AML could follow Ferrari's success on the stock market. JP Morgan (IPO sponsor), Goldman 
Sachs, and Deutsche Bank were the global coordinators. AML relied on the following described 
aggressive targets of the third phase of the Second Century Plan to justify comparison to Ferrari. 
The DB11 and its variants, the new Vantage, and specials were on track to generate 6,200-
6,400 in sales volumes in 2018. In 2019, the Gaydon factory was expected to reach full production 
capacity at 7,100-7,300 vehicles with DBS Superleggera's launch. The DBX would be the hit of 
2020, triggering the plan's third phase of expanding to new segments. St Athan factory would be 
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finished in 2019, and DBX production would start in 2020 when it was expected to deliver 2,700 
units and 4,750 units from 2021 onwardsxliv. Like Ferrari, AML expected to increase sports car 
volumes from 7,000 to 10,000 units a year to reach an overall capacity of around 14,000 units by 
2022xlv. The firm expected capital expenditures (including R&D) to reach £380 million in 2018. In 
the medium-term, AML expected total capital expenditures to go below 15% of revenuesxlvi. 
AML needed exceptional operational performance and a clear strategy to boost supply without 
deteriorating brand exclusivity and ASP. First, it counted on the resilient luxury car segment, 
expected to grow around 18% between 2018 and 2023xlvii. This was linked to the growth of HNWI 
and their spending in luxury cars, the luxury segment with the highest growth (>20% CAGR in the 
previous four years). Before 2018, the Asia-Pacific region (APAC), particularly China, led growth 
in HNWI (see Exhibit 3). Compared to the European luxury goods benchmark, Aston Martin sales 
were underweighting APAC (23% against 42%). AML planned to add 40 dealerships worldwide, 
of which 22 would be placed in APAC, the highest-growth market in demandxlviii (see Exhibit 10).  
Aston Martin posed great hopes on DBX while heading to the IPO. The Luxury SUV segment 
was expected to grow by 30% in 10 yearsxlix since it broadened the customer base and was 
increasingly popular in China. Almost 70% of Aston Martin's customers owned an SUV, and 
expected production volumes were in line with competitors' salesl (see Exhibit 11). AML also 
expected to have hybrid technology in every car from 2020li and introduce the first electric high 
luxury sedan, the Rapide E. The company planned to use the electric car's platform to restore the 
Lagonda brand as an ultra-luxury electric car brand, building a sedan and SUVlii.  
Enhancing demand and building a global luxury brand required significant marketing costs. 
The company sustained marketing activities such as the 007 films and showcases in the Geneva 
Motor Show. AML announced it would be the Red Bull F1 team's title sponsor from 2018liii. In 
2019, AML was expecting to focus marketing on the DBX launch. Palmer also pretended to extend 
the brand through partnerships to luxury residences, powerboats, and even submarinesliv 
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AML's road to being priced close to Ferrari's multiples would be arduous. First, it projected an 
unproven growth on capacity and revenues, expecting to stabilize EBITDA margin around 30% in 
just five years, during a multi-segment expansion. Second, AML had six years of losses before 
2017, even capitalizing 95% of R&D costs, compared to Ferrari and the average automaker R&D 
capitalization of around 40%lv. Finally, the possibility of a "No deal" Brexit added concerns. Palmer 
referred that AML was "relatively well insulated"lvi from its effects since the company sells more 
units in the UK than in Europe, and a weaker pound benefits price competitiveness abroad. 
However, 60% of its parts are imported from the EU, leaving it exposed to disruptions or tariffslvii.  
Brexit's uncertainty and the precedent it could open to EU countries that were skeptical about 
remaining in the union were fuelling market volatility. In the first nine months of 2018, EMEA's 
IPO withdrawals reached the highest levels since 2011lviii. Several companies were waiting for 
better market conditions in 2019. However, AML was determined to go forward with its IPO at the 
beginning of October. AML's private equity shareholders, owning 97%, would sell 25% of AML's 
stake in the IPO at the price range of £17.50-£22.50lix. The company chose not to raise proceeds for 
its purposes. If shares traded at the range's midpoint, Andy Palmer would gain more than £22 
million in stock until 2022, while senior managers would collect up to £20 million. The institutional 
offer, comprising more than 90% of the share offer size, would be fully underwrittenlx. 
On October 3, 2018, Aston Martin listed 25% of its shares under the ticker "AML" at an issue 
price of £19.00lxi, reaching a £4.33 billion market capitalization (see Exhibit 12 for IPO details). 
The company needed at least a market cap of £4.70 billion to enter in FTSE 100lxii, falling short of 
Palmer's dream to lead AML to join one of the most traded indexes in Europe. Yet, AML was 
valued at multiples close to Ferrari, breaking ground for other carmakers considering their luxury 
brands' listinglxiii. The IPO deal was mostly backed by institutional investors and was very 
concentrated as the top 10 orders made 70% of the IPO. These orders were mainly directed to UK 
and US long-only accounts and growth fundslxiv. The IPO raised £1.05 billion for AML's private 
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equity owners Adeem/PW Shareholder Group, which reduced its stake from 57.1% to 34.6% and 
InvestIndustrial from 39.7% to 30.9%.  
 
The IPO aftermath 
Aston Martin convinced enough investors to reach over £4 billion IPO valuation. However, it 
could not sustain this value when trading began. After just 15 minutes, AML's stock price fell below 
the IPO price and closed the first trading day losing 5%. In the first trading week, AML's stock price 
shrunk almost 16% relative to the IPO offer price and was already seen as another IPO failure in 
2018lxv. The word "overhyped" consistently came up as investors and traders were debating on the 
possible reasons. Some arguments pointed out that retail investors were not convinced of AML's 
risky plan of launching a multi-segment expansion, and an IPO valuation inflated by a much larger 
R&D capitalization than Ferrari. James Congdon, Quest managing director, was one of the skeptical 
investors: "(It) has very aggressive growth plans. The execution of that growth needs to be flawless 
- nothing eats cash more than a car company when the cycle turns"lxvi.  
AML confirmed the highest fiscal year revenue ever at £1.1 billion in 2018, exceeding 
expectations with 6,441 cars sold (see Exhibit 13). The Americas and APAC regions became the 
brand's strongest markets, where sales more than doubled under the Second Century Planlxvii. 
However, AML announced a £68 million pre-tax loss after spending £136 million in the IPOlxviii. 
AML maintained high levels of capital expenditures towards developing new models and 
expanding capacity, which were necessarily supported by long term funds. In order to keep funding 
product development, AML issued $190 million in 6.50% senior secured notes in April 2019lxix, 
constituting a further issuance of the Notes issued in April 2017. 
AML hoped to react in 2019 with the Vantage model that had a lower selling price and 
expected sales volumes of 3,250 vehicles. The firm produced and shipped this model to dealerships 
in order to reduce clients' waiting lists, expecting high demand after higher-than-expected orders in 
2018. In 2019, DBS Superleggera, the most exclusive and powerful model of the current core line-
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up, was also ready for distribution. However, marketing activities were turned to the DBX for its 
relevance to the future cash flow generation. The attention given to the new models deteriorated 
demand for Vantage, which had accumulated inventories in dealerships from the end of 2018lxx. 
On July 24, 2019, AML slashed forecasts for the year, announcing 6,300-6,500 (against 7,100 
expected), operating margin at 8% (against 13% expected), and EBITDA margin of 20% (against 
24%), even capitalizing R&Dlxxi. AML closed the day losing 26% (60% below the IPO issue price), 
as markets reacted with record short positions against AML's securitieslxxii. Palmer called it a "black 
swan moment"lxxiii and blamed the lower UK-European market demand. AML accumulated excess 
inventories, which added de-stocking and customer financing support costs after producing on spec 
rather than on orderlxxiv. Customer deposits for new models were holding working capital 
requirements. However, AML announced a £79 million pre-tax loss for the first half of 2019. 
Having liquidity issues and being unable to meet short-term obligations, AML issued $150 
million in 12% senior secured notes due 2022, on September 25, 2019. Half the 12% coupon was 
PIK interest, implying the option of raising debt to serve interest payments, usually seen as high-
risk securities (see Exhibit 14 for details on Debt). S&P downgraded the credit rating from B- to 
CCC+, referring that AML "has reached the ceiling in terms of the amount of term debt and cash 
interest burden that it can sustainably service."lxxv 
In the second half of 2019, AML kept failing sales targets, mainly for the Vantage model. Even 
the final quarter, usually the largest selling season, disappointed with 13% less revenue than the last 
quarter of 2018lxxvi. Negative operating results, high interest expenses, and investment needs left 
the company desperately looking for investors and even considering the option to borrow $100 
million at a 15% interest ratelxxvii. During December and January, AML has held talks with 
Lawrence Stroll, the Racing Point F1 team owner, and the Chinese automaker Geely, owner of 
Volvo and Lotus. Both were considering to acquire 20% of AML but had different strategic 




Lawrence Stroll and the rescue deal 
On January 31, 2020, AML announced it would place £182 million in equity to the Yew Tree 
consortium of investors led by Lawrence Stroll. The equity issue would be followed by a 
transferrable rights issue of £318 million fully underwritten by JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, and 
Deutsche Banklxxix. The rights entitled shareholders to buy 14 shares for every 25 shares owned at 
207p (see Exhibit 15 for details). Stroll surged as the right strategic investor and described Aston 
Martin as a "phenomenal brand with tremendous potential" and a "gem that needs love."lxxx  
Lawrence Stroll was a Canadian billionaire recognized for his role in the global luxury fashion 
expansion and his passion for luxury cars and motorsport industries. His career started three decades 
before when his father secured Pierre Cardin and Ralph Lauren license for Canada. He later 
replicated the model by taking Ralph Lauren to Europe. In 1989, Stroll and Hong Kong investor 
Silas Chou formed a partnership to acquire and develop luxury fashion brands. They started with 
Tommy Hilfiger and later Pepe Jeans and Asprey & Garrard. In 2003, they acquired a majority 
interest in Michael Kors for £100 million and later led the brand to a multi-billionaire IPO, which 
constituted the bulk of Stroll's fortune. In 2018, Stroll acquired the struggling Force India F1 team, 
later renamed Racing Point, where his son succeeded as a driverlxxxi. 
As part of the deal terms, Lawrence Stroll would assume the role of Executive Chairman, after 
shareholders and the market had lost faith in Palmer's executive team. He expected to implement a 
reset business plan, where AML would take "one step back before taking five steps forwards."lxxxii 
First, he aimed to rebalance inventories and prioritize demand over supply. Second, focus on 
successful DBX deliveries to relieve short-term financial pressures and drive sales volumes. Third, 
AML would delay investments in electric vehicles to 2025 and reenforce the platform of mid-engine 
cars, a segment dominated by Ferrari. AML expected to launch three hypercars until 2023, priced 
above £1 million. The Valkyrie's 150 orders, priced at £2.4 million, would start to be delivered in 
2020 H2lxxxiii. These models engineering would be continuously developed and marketed in 
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Formula 1, as Racing Point would become the Aston Martin F1 team from 2021. AML would have 
its own F1 team after 60 years, which might become its leading marketing tool. Volumes were 
expected to stabilize at 10,000 units (instead of 14,000) in the medium-term. AML would focus on 
existing car platforms with higher selling prices to drive revenues and reduce Capexlxxxiv.  
AML reported a 9% decrease in revenues for 2019, with only 5,862 units sold at lower 
ASPlxxxv. The Americas remained strong, with a 35% increase in volumes. However, the UK and 
the rest of Europe declined by 21% and 28%, respectively, following Brexit and economic 
uncertainty (see Exhibit 16). AML also failed SG&A cost savings targets and incurred additional 
marketing expenses with the launch of DBX, leading to pre-tax losses of £104 million and Mark 
Wilson to step down as CFOlxxxvi. Contrarily, Ferrari sales increased 9% (YoY), and Bentley and 
Lamborghini reached revenue growth at 35% and 28%, respectively, driven by Luxury SUV sales. 
AML's new SUV DBX exceeded the retail target for orders in 2020lxxxvii. However, deliveries would 
only start in the second half of 2020, and St Athan factory costs were already supported.  
The capital raised would be targeted to resume product development investments and halt the 
liquidity crisis intensified by COVID-19lxxxviii. Stroll aimed to enhance cash generation to support 
investments and improve the balance sheet. At the end of 2019, AML presented a leverage ratio of 
7.5x EBITDA (capitalizing all R&D expenses). The great majority of obligations maturing in 2022, 
which AML expected to refinance at better terms closer to maturitylxxxix (see Exhibit 14). However, 
the COVID-19 pandemic would bring uncertainty as demand in China was plunging, and marketing 
events were delayed or canceled. For instance, the new 007 movie, No time to die, featuring four 
different Aston Martin cars, was postponed for seven monthsxc. AML's adverse expectations sent 
its stock below the rights issue price (see Exhibit 17 for the AML securities price performance).  
The rescue deal was renegotiated, and the amended rights offered four new shares for each 
share owned at a 30p offer price, representing an 86% discount to the last price before the 
announcement (214p). The gross proceeds from the rights issue increased to £365 million. The 
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major shareholders committed to take-up most rights. The consortium would acquire 76 million 
shares at 225p (5% premium relative to 214p), investing £171 million for a 25% stake, a day before 
the rights 17-days subscription period starting on April 1, 2020. The consortium would increase the 
investment to £262 million after exercising 100% of its rights. The gross proceeds from the equity 
placement (£171M) and rights issue (£365M) increased to 536 millionxci (see Exhibit 15).  
Nevertheless, on March 18, S&P downgraded AML's credit rating to CCC-, which depressed 
its debt securities market value. S&P stressed that although AML was suffering a liquidity crisis, it 
continued to invest significantly in new models, while the rescue finance was taking too long to 
materialize. S&P would maintain a credit watch until it could evaluate AML's post-rights issue 
liquidity, the impact of COVID-19 in profitabilityxcii.  
The COVID-19 pandemic forced governments around the world to declare lockdowns. With 
factories and dealerships closed, April was set to be the worst month since World War II for 
automakersxciii. Strong order books for luxury cars partially mitigated the impact of closing 
dealerships, but the industry was not safe from suspended production at least for a month. Deliveries 
would be delayed, compromising sales and margins, and stretching capital requirements in the first 
half of 2020. Exhibit 18 shows information regarding peers, including YTD stock return. AML 
was not motivated to disclose financial results for the first quarter of 2020 since it was expecting 
around half of the volumes sold at a lower ASP than the first quarter of 2019. 
 
The Decision 
Lawrence Stroll had assured that the rescue finance gave "the necessary stability to reset the 
business for its long-term future"xciv, but as the liquidity crisis deepened, he was getting more 
reluctant. Several questions arose as he was preparing to become AML's Executive Chairman: 
"Does my plan deliver the right path for strong performance and value-added for shareholders? 
How can I avoid past mistakes that led to a difficult financial situation? How can I turn Aston Martin 
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